SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent Third Circuit cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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First National Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
1991).
First National Fidelity Corporation (First National) issued an
$11,844.22 mortgage to Ruth Perry (Perry). 945 F.2d 61, 62 (3d
Cir. 1991). Following default, Perry filed a bankruptcy petition
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code). The
Chapter 13 plan proposed a five-year payment of $13,562 plus
interest to First National.
First National moved to vacate the automatic stay relating to
the foreclosure proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied the
motion and confirmed Perry's plan. Reversing the bankruptcy
court, the district court did not confirm the proposed plan, reasoning that Code section 1322 (b)(2) (subsection 2) disallowed
payment of a foreclosure judgment during a Chapter 13 plan.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
affirming the district court judgment, held that the section's prohibition against modifying the rights of a home mortgage lender
dictated against confirmation of the proposed plan. Id. at 67.
Judge Stapleton, writing for the court, began by reviewing subsection 2's language which permitted a Chapter 13 plan to modify a secured creditor's rights. Id. at 62 (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322 (b)(2), (b)(5) (1988)). The court emphasized, however,
that subsection 2 specifically excluded home mortgage lenders
from the class of secured creditors whose rights may be altered.
Id.
Reviewing related precedent, the appellate panel noted that
the section did not authorize the cure and reinstatement of a
home mortgage following foreclosure. Id. (quoting In re Roach,
824 F.2d 1370, 1371-72 (3d Cir. 1987)). The court of appeals,
explaining Roach, determined that a lender's state law right to
immediate payment of foreclosure proceeds was inapposite to
the cure authorized by subsection 5. Id. at 63. Noting that
Roach's- plan did not constitute a cure under subsection 5 and
that subsection 2 prohibited alteration of a lender's rights, the
appeals court concluded that the federal statute did not preempt
the creditor's state law right to receive the foreclosure proceeds.
Id.
The appellate panel then examined the objectives underly-
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ing Chapter 13. Id. Chapter 13, the court explained, allowed
debt repayment over an extended time. Id. (citation omitted).
The court of appeals further advanced that alteration of creditors' rights was necessary to achieve Chapter 13's goal. Id. The
home mortgage exception was required, Judge Stapleton stated,
to avoid extraordinary conservatism by home mortgage lenders
thereby ensuring availability of home mortgages. Id. at 63-64 (citation omitted). The court stressed that subsection 2's specific
exclusion of such lenders prohibited the modification of a home
mortgage lender's rights. Id. at 64. Chapter 13, the judge asserted, only authorized the cure of a mortgagor's default. Id.
Recognizing that subsection 2 applied only to claims secured
by a security interest in the debtor's residence, the court of appeals concluded that a home mortgagee retained a security interest in the mortgaged property after foreclosure. Id. The
appellate panel reasoned that, if alteration of the lender's rights
was permitted after foreclosure, any subsection 2 protection
would be illusory. Id. at 65.
The court continued by addressing whether a Chapter 13
payment of a foreclosure judgment was a prohibited modification
under subsection 2. Id. The appellate panel noted that a debtor's
right of redemption following the foreclosure sale extended for
ten days under New Jersey law and for sixty days under the Code.
Id. The Third Circuit concluded that the payment of a foreclosure judgment over the life of a Chapter 13 plan substantially
extended the redemption time and, therefore, constituted a modification of the mortgagee's rights. Id.
The Third Circuit, thereafter, rejected Perry's arguments
that no modification existed. Id. Initially, the court declined to
follow cases that permitted reinstatement of accelerated mortgages contrary to state law. Id. The court, refusing to accept
Perry's classification of these actions, concluded that these cases
authorized the cure of mortgages rather than modifications. Id.
Secondly, the appellate panel concluded that Code section
1325(a) did not indicate that a Chapter 13 plan constituted a
modification. Id. at 66. The court stated that section 1325(a) required confirmation of a plan providing for property distribution
equal to or exceeding the value of the claim. Id. (quoting 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1988)). Noting that section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)
limited the modification of lenders' rights, the court explained
that a modification to the mortgage was a prerequisite to the application of section 1325(a). Id. (quoting Appeal of Capps, 836
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F.2d 773, 776 (3d Cir. 1987)). The court asserted that subsection 2's prohibition against modification of a mortgage made application of section 1325(a) inappropriate. Id.
The court further refused to adopt the rationale of a prior
decision which interpreted "modification" to exclude the Chapter 13 payment of a foreclosure judgment when the lender's expectations were not jeopardized. Id. (citing In re Brunson, 87
B.R. 304 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988)). The court of appeals explained
that subsection 2 had been construed to disallow only modifications which permitted reduction of an undersecured claim to the
collateral's value. Id. (quoting Brunson, 87 B.R. at 309.) The
Third Circuit advanced, however, that this rationale did not survive a subsequent decision. Id. (citing Wilson v. Commonwealth
Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d at 123 (3d Cir. 1990)). In the subsequent case, the appellate panel asserted, subsection 2 was held
inapplicable to the unsecured portion of an undersecured creditor's claim. Id. (citing Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127). Construing subsection 2 to protect only secured portions of a mortgagee's claim,
the Third Circuit concluded that home lenders must either be
treated similar to other creditors or protected against the type of
modification proposed by Perry. Id.
Finally, the court refused to interpret subsection 2 to prohibit only modification of terms other than the amount and payment schedule. Id. at 66-67. The appellate panel doubted that
such minor protection would reassure home lenders that their
rights were not altered by a Chapter 13 plan. Id. at 67. The
Third Circuit concluded that protection of home mortgage lenders required subsection 2 to prohibit the payment of a foreclosure judgment over the life of a Chapter 13 plan. Id.
By interpreting a Chapter 13 payment of a foreclosure judgment as an improper modification under subsection 2, the Third
Circuit reduced the probability of a debtor retaining his residence following foreclosure. This harsh result is contrary to
Chapter 13's intent to facilitate individual debt repayment. Application of the Brunson interpretation of "modification" adequately ensures payment of the mortgage and, thus, realizes the
mortgagee's expectations.
The result advocated in Brunson, however, is inconsistent
with bankruptcy law. Allowing payment of the foreclosure judgment under a Chapter 13 plan pragmatically extends the period
of redemption contrary to explicit state regulations and federal
bankruptcy laws. Furthermore, Roach precluded reinstatement of
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mortgages following foreclosure. This precedent, however, has
been circumvented by categorizing Chapter 13 plans as actions
taken to satisfy the judgment, rather than actions to reinstate the
mortgage. In Perry, the Third Circuit effectively remedied efforts
to avoid explicit redemption provisions and legal precedent.
Alison L. Galer

FRAUD-FALSE CLAIMS AcT-QuI TAM SUITS BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS
ARE

JURISDICTIONALLY

BARRED

UNDER

THE

FALSE

CLAIM

AcT-United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante,
P.A. v. Prudential Insurance Company, 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir.
1991).
The Florida law firm of Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante
(Stinson) represented Armlon Leonard, a sixty-seven year old
man, in connection with injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 944 F.2d at 1151. Leonard was eligible for coverage under
both his employer's group insurance plan, provided by Provident
Life and Accident Insurance Company (Provident), and Medicare. While processing Leonard's claim, Stinson became suspicious that Provident's claim processing practice violated the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which explicitly
shifted primary liability to the private group plan when an insured senior was eligible for coverage under both a private plan
and Medicare. Stinson discovered, however, that Provident was
allowing Medicare to act as Leonard's primary liability carrier.
Responding to this allegation, Provident sought a declaratory judgment from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida,
seeking to establish the legitimacy of Provident's claim practices.
Through pre-trial discovery in this litigation (Leonard I), Stinson
acquired two internal Provident documents that implicated other
insurance carriers, including the Prudential Insurance Company
(Prudential), in similar fraudulent claim processing practices.
Based on this information, Stinson brought actions against Provi-
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dent and Prudential under the qui tam provisions of the False
Claim Act (FCA), alleging that these companies defrauded the
federal government by permitting Medicare to be the primary insurer of the working seniors.
The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, relying on the FCA's jurisdictional provisions, dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1152. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, utilizing
plenary review over the district court's dismissal, affirmed the
district court's decision. Id.
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Sloviter noted that the
FCA allowed civil actions to be brought by the United States, or
by private plaintiffs on behalf of the Government, against entities
that knowingly defraud the Government. Id. The majority explained that the FCA required the private, or qui tam, plaintiff to
disclose to the Government the information it based its FCA
claim on, and allow the Government sixty days to intervene or
refrain from the suit. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1988)). If
the Government refrained, Judge Sloviter added, the qui tam
plaintiff may proceed with the suit unless the FCA jurisdictional
provisions barred the claim. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)
(1988)). The court noted that the specific issue on appeal was
whether the jurisdictional provisions-which prohibited suits
based on public disclosures or resulting from hearings unless the
individual bringing the action was the original source of the information-precluded Stinson's FCA claim. Id. at 1152-53. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (1988)).
Before addressing this specific issue, however, the majority
traced the statute's evolution. Id. at 1153. The court explained
that the FCA arose in 1863 in response to mass fraudulent claims
made by Civil War contractors. Id. Judge Sloviter observed that
Congress amended the FCA several times, the last being in 1986.
Id. at 1154. The majority posited that Congress designed the
1986 amendment to encourage individuals with first-hand information to report fraudulent misconduct against the federal government. Id. (citations omitted).
Next, the majority interpreted the three essential elements
of the jurisdictional provision-hearing, public disclosure, and
original source-to determine if Stinson's qui tam suit was
barred. Id. at 1154, 1157, 1160. First, the court construed the
definition of "hearing" to encompass the full range of civil litigation proceedings, including the pre-trial discovery in Leonard I.
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Id. at 1155. The majority reasoned, however, that this alone did
not dispose of the jurisdictional issue. The court, therefore, addressed whether Stinson's cause of action was predicated on a
public disclosure arising from the Leonard I litigation. Id. at
1157.
Addressing this element, the court determined that pre-trial
discovery was not a public component of civil litigation. Id. (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)). The
majority asserted that, in the absence of a protective order, the
public potentially had access to pre-trial discovery information.
Id. at 1157-58. Therefore, Judge Sloviter reasoned that pre-trial
discovery materials, even if not filed with the court, were public
disclosures. Id. at 1158.
After determining that Provident publicly disclosed the
memoranda, the court examined the sole exception to the jurisdictional statute-specifically, whether Stinson was the original
source of the information. Id. at 1160. The court recognized that
the FCA defined "original source" as an individual who possessed independent and direct knowledge of the information that
suggested fraud. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(2)(B)(1988)).
The court noted that while "[t]he paradigmatic 'original source'
[was] a whistleblowing insider", other individuals qualified if the
information resulted from their own investigations. Id. at 1161.
Judge Sloviter concluded, however, that Stinson did not qualify.
Id. The judge reasoned that Stinson did not possess independent
and direct knowledge of the Provident documents because it obtained the information through pre-trial discovery proceedings
and not through its own investigations. Id. Accordingly, the
court ruled that the FCA's jurisdictional provisions barred Stinson's qui tam action against Prudential. Id.
In dissent, Judge Scirica claimed that the majority decision
reduced the incentive for private parties to bring qui tam actions
against entities defrauding the government. Id. at 1162 (Scirica,
J., dissenting). Judge Scirica asserted that the Provident documents were not publicly disclosed when Stinson obtained them
and that Stinson was the original source of the information. Id.
After exhaustively reviewing the FCA's legislative history, Judge
Scirica reasoned that Stinson's information was not publicly disclosed in a civil hearing. Id. at 1162-70 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
Instead, the dissent claimed that pre-trial discovery materials
only become public when filed. Id. at 1171 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Therefore, because Stinson obtained the Provident memo-
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randa before the documents were filed, Judge Scirica concluded
that they were not publicly disclosed. Id. Furthermore, the dissent posited that because Stinson actually filed the discovery
materials, it qualified as the information's original source. Id. at
1172 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
The dissent reasoned that Congress intended the originalsource exception to encompass individuals who possessed nonpublicly disclosed information, but who lacked first-hand knowledge. Id. Judge Scirica added that the original-source exception
should not be limited to the majority's paradigm of the
whistleblowing insider. Id. at 1173 (Scirica, J., dissenting). The
dissent further asserted that Congress intended to encourage individuals, such as Stinson, to bring forward non-public information alleging fraud against the Government, regardless of how
they acquired the information. Id. Thus, Judge Scirica concluded
that Stinson's qui tam claim was not barred by the jurisdictional
provisions because the information was not publicly disclosed
and Stinson was the information's original source. Id. at 1176
(Scirica, J., dissenting).
Congress promulgated the FCA qui tam provision to encourage private citizens to actively protect the federal government from fraudulent claims. Often, private citizens are privy to
information implicating individuals or entities that are defrauding the government. Lawyers, for example, are often exposed to such information in pre-trial discovery proceedings.
The Third Circuit's narrow interpretation of the FCA's jurisdictional provisions, however, will effectively extinguish this fertile
information source and bar lawyers from bringing qui tam suits.
Although this decision will adversely affect lawyers as prospective
qui tam plaintiffs, the true victims are America's senior citizens
who rely solely on the over-burdened Medicare system.
Matthew . Giacobbe
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BANKRUPTCY-FEDERAL-STATE

COMITY BANKRUPTCY AND
DISTRICT COURTS LACK POWER TO REVIEW MERITS OF STATE

FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS-In reJames,

940 F.2d 46 (3d Cir.

1991).
On March 2, 1988, NewJersey state troopers discovered currency totaling $7,990 in a car driven by Patrick Brown. 940 F.2d
at 47 (3d Cir. 1991). A narcotics detection dog reacted to the
currency, indicating the potential presence of a controlled substance. A subsequent investigation revealed no additional evidence of illegal drugs and the car was returned to its owner,
Norma James. The police, however, kept the seized currency because they suspected a link to illegal drug activity based on the
dog's reaction and Brown's inconsistent statements regarding
ownership of the money. Id. at 47-48.
The State of New Jersey filed a civil forfeiture action against
the currency holder under a state law that provided for forfeiture
of criminal proceeds. Id. at 48 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:64-1).
Although the state notified James of the action, she did not respond timely. James subsequently obtained counsel, asserted full
ownership of the money and sought a continuance. Due to failure to file the continuance, however, a default judgment hearing
was scheduled for July 21, 1989. James received notification of
the hearing on July 18 and filed for bankruptcy the following day.
James asserted that the state received notice of the bankruptcy
filing prior to the scheduled hearing. Despite her contention, the
court entered a default judgment after James failed to appear.
In bankruptcy court, James argued that the state court's entry of default judgment violated the Bankruptcy Code's (the
Code) automatic stay provision. Id. Pursuant to the Code's turnover provision, James requested an order demanding the seized
currency be turned over to her trustee. Id. Examining the merits
of the state forfeiture action, the bankruptcy court found no evidentiary basis to support the proceeding. Id. The bankruptcy
court further held that forfeiture actions did not fall within the
police power exception to the automatic stay provision. The
bankruptcy court, therefore, vacated the state court default judgment and ordered the state to transfer the seized currency to
James' trustee. Id. at 48-49.
On appeal, the district court determined that a state forfeiture proceeding was excepted from the automatic stay. Id. at 49.
The district court, however, determined that no factual basis sup-
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ported a forfeiture action in this case. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that a civil forfeiture action fell within the police
power exception to the automatic stay provision. Ultimately,
however, the panel held that the bankruptcy and district courts
lacked the power to evaluate the merits of a state court forfeiture
judgment. Id. at 51, 52.
Writing for the court, Judge Aldisert first reviewed the Code
provisions that permitted an automatic suspension of judicial
proceedings when a debtor files for bankruptcy. Id. at 49 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988)). The court explained, however, that the stay did not apply to a governmental unit's exercise
of its police power. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988)).
Working within this statutory framework, the court initially
addressed whether a civil forfeiture action constituted the exercise of police power. Id. at 50. Relying on the plain language of
§ 362(b)(4), the Third Circuit rejected the narrow construction
of the police power provision adopted by the bankruptcy court.
Id. at 50-51. (citing In re Ryan, 15 B.R. 514, 519 (Bankr. Md.
1981)). The court reasoned that the language of the police
power exception was not limited to enumerated instances, but
instead extended to any action taken by a governmental unit to
enforce its police power. Id. at 51. A civil forfeiture proceeding,
the court concluded, represented a governmental unit's exercise
of its police power to combat the possession and use of illegal
drugs. Id.
The Third Circuit then considered whether federal courts,
other than the United States Supreme Court, had the power to
evaluate the merits of state forfeiture actions. Id. Noting that federal courts ordinarily cannot enjoin state court proceedings,
Judge Aldisert observed that a bankruptcy court had the authority to suspend a state proceeding that violated an automatic stay.
Id. The court explained that a stay did not dismiss the suit or
oust the state court's jurisdiction, but merely postponed the proceedings. Id. (citing Hill v. Harding, 107 U.S. 631, 633-34
(1883)). The court stressed that the stay provision should not be
construed to override state law because Congress did not explicitly provide for pre-emption. Id. at 51-52 (quoting Penn Terra
Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 272-73
(3d Cir. 1984)).
The judge concluded that both the bankruptcy court and the
district court impermissibly considered the merits of the state
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court proceeding. Id. at 53. Federal-state comity, the court explained, required that a state court judgment remain valid unless
vacated by the issuing court or a supervisory appellate court. Id.
at 52, The court stressed that the bankruptcy court did not have
the power to intervene with state court proceedings simply because it disagreed with the state court decision. Id. The judge
emphasized that federal courts may vacate state judgments only
when they are void ab initio. Id. (citing Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308
U.S. 433, 438-40 (1940)). The court asserted that vacating a
void judgment was a formality that did not intrude on federalstate comity. Id. Only the United States Supreme Court, Judge
Aldisert stated, may review the merits of a state court decision.
Id. (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 476 (1983)).
Judge Aldisert concluded by stressing that James was not
without judicial relief. Id. The court explained that James could
have acted to prevent the default judgment in the state court system. Id. The judge, therefore, refused to allow the debtor to
frustrate governmental actions by shielding herself in bankruptcy
court. Id. at 53-54 (citing United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d
202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988)).
In In rejames, the Third Circuit properly recognized that the
police power exception to the automatic stay included forfeiture
actions used by the states to combat pervasive drug problems.
Judge Aldisert reached this determination by correctly undertaking a literal interpretation of the provision's language. To hold
otherwise would send a wrong message in this battle. Contrary
to the bankruptcy court's interpretation in In re Ryan, the Third
Circuit justifiably concluded that forfeiture actions involve a
state's interest in protecting the public and do not concern a
state's pecuniary motivation. As the court of appeals stressed,
section 362(b)(4) was enacted to prevent defendants from hindering the state's enforcement of its police powers by filing for
bankruptcy.
The Third Circuit's decision also halted a dangerous practice by the bankruptcy and district courts. The lower courts improperly employed the Code's exception as an opportunity to
question the merits of a state court judgment. As the appellate
court pointed out, a defendant can obtain relief only from the
court system that entered the valid judgment. If the federal
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courts were permitted to review state court judgments, inconsistent and confused legal precedents would abound.
Larisa L. Van Kirk

CONTRACTS-Box-Top

LICENSE
AGREEMENTS-UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 2-207 PRECLUDES ENFORCEMENT
OF Box-Top LICENSE AGREEMENTS WHEN TERMS Do NOT
CORRESPOND WITH PREVIOUSLY-REACHED AGREEMENTS-Step-

Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1991).
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. (Step-Saver), a retailer of
computers, negotiated with The Software Link, Inc. (TSL) and
Wyse Technology (Wyse) to obtain software and terminals for its
multi-user computer system. 939 F.2d at 94. Combining
software programs created for particular consumer groups, StepSaver included its own software and off-the-shelf software in a

package comprised of Wyse terminals and TSL programs. Id. at
93, 94.
Step-Saver purchased and resold 142 copies of TSL's Multilink Advanced program, initiating the sales through telephone
calls to TSL. Id. at 95-96. Step-Saver sent purchase orders to

TSL, stipulating the program to be purchased, delivery terms,
payment terms and purchase price. Id. at 96. TSL's subsequent
delivery included invoices containing virtually identical specifications. Neither party expressed any intent regarding warranties
and disclaimers in any of the telephone conversations, purchase

orders or invoices. TSL, however, printed a license agreement
on the program packaging which stipulated: 1) that the purchaser

gained only a nontransferable license to use the enclosed
software program without any ownership rights; 2) that all warranties, express or implied, were disclaimed by the seller, except
the guarantee that the enclosed disks were not defective; 3) that
the purchaser's sole recourse against the seller for defective disks
would be replacement and the purchaser was also precluded
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from seeking either direct or circumstantial damages caused by
the use of a defective disk; 4) that the license agreement constituted the final and complete expression of the parties' intent; and
5) that the purchaser may either open the package and thereby
consent to the terms and disclaimers in the license or return the
box unopened for a refund. Id. at 96-97.
Step-Saver began marketing its multi-user system in November 1986, but within months began receiving complaints regarding defects. Id. at 94. Step-Saver investigated the problems and
referred the complaints to both Wyse and TSL, requesting their
assistance. After Wyse and TSL refused to acknowledge any responsibility, Step-Saver instituted suit against both parties seeking indemnity through a declaratory judgment.
The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey dismissed Step-Saver's declaratory judgment action and
denied indemnity. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
Subsequently, Step-Saver instituted a second action against both
Wyse and TSL claiming breach of warranties and against TSL for
intentional misrepresentation. The district court declared that
the box-top license constituted a complete and exclusive agreement under section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
Code). Granting TSL's motion in limine to suppress any evidence
of alleged warranties, the district court stated that the box-top
license properly expressed TSL's disclaimer of all express and
implied warranties. Id. at 94-95. Thereafter, the district court directed a verdict for TSL after finding that Step-Saver failed to
establish a prima facie case for intentional misrepresentation. Id.
at 95. Following a trial on the breach of warranty claims, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Wyse.
Judge Wisdom of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation and writing for the court, initially determined that the parties' conduct in ordering, shipping
and receiving the programs created a contract. Therefore, according to Judge Wisdom, U.C.C. § 2-207 (the UCC) was appropriate to determine if an intent to adopt the box-top language
could be inferred from the parties' conduct. Id. at 98. The court
stated that the UCC determined the terms of the contract when
the parties neglected to formally reduce the agreement to a single writing or exchanged contradictory writings. Id. The court
explained that, although an existing contract may be modified, an
additional writing would not alter an earlier agreement unless
such a result was intended by the parties. Id. Noting that the
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TSC did not expressly adopt the box-top agreement, the judge
advanced that the UCC was appropriately applied to determine
whether an intent to adopt the box-top language could be inferred by Step-Saver's continuation with the contract. Id.
Applying the UCC, Judge Wisdom rejected TSL's contention that the agreement between the parties lacked definiteness
prior to addition of the box-top license. Id. at 100. The court
found that Step-Saver and TSL reached an agreement, prior to
delivery of the box-top license, regarding the type, quantity and
price of the goods. Id. The court, however, did not find the contract warranties indefinite because the UCC default provisions
imposed warranty terms in any contract which failed to explicate
such warranties. Id. Judge Wisdom, therefore, declared the contract sufficiently definite. Id.
Continuing its UCC analysis, the court rejected TSL's characterization of the license as a conditional acceptance. Id. at 10001. The panel contemplated three different tests used by courts
in determining the existence or absence of a conditional acceptance. Id. at 101-02. Judge Wisdom rejected the first test, which
categorized an offeree's response as a conditional acceptance
when it materially altered the contract to the offeror's detriment.
Id. at 101. Similarly, the court refuted the second test which required specific language stating that the only terms acceptable to
the offeror were those contained in the written confirmation. Id.
Judge Wisdom, instead, adopted the third test which demanded
that the offeree demonstrate unwillingness to consummate the
sale without the additional or different terms. Id.
Applying this test, the judge found the "consent" language
on the box top insufficient to evidence an unwillingness to proceed with the contract absent the inclusion of such language and,
thus, insufficient to establish a conditional acceptance. Id. at 102.
The court additionally considered TSL's assurances that the
terms did not affect Step-Saver but, rather, applied to the final
user as a further indication that TSL willingly proceeded with the
contract without the inclusion of the box-top terms. Id. The
judge noted TSL's assertion that the box top represented a conditional acceptance that contradicted the parties' express agreement regarding the free transferability of the program. Id. at
102-03. Therefore, the court concluded that TSL could not
claim an unwillingness to proceed without the box-top license's
warranty disclaimer because a party cannot selectively enforce or
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waive certain provisions of a purportedly nonnegotiable contract
and expect a court to later uphold the entire agreement. Id.
Judge Wisdom also rejected TSL's alternate assertion that
Step-Saver was bound by the license because of its continued ordering and use of the program. Id. at 103-04. The court asserted
that such repetition merely inferred that TSL desired to incorporate the terms but did not mandate this inclusion. Id. at 104.
When the seller unsuccessfully attempted to incorporate certain
terms before shipment of the goods, the court opined that a reasonable purchaser could justifiably infer that the terms were not
part of the final contract. Id. The court recognized Step-Saver's
refusal to sign TSL's proposed disclaimers and the extensive
time and resources TSL devoted to consumer complaints. Id.
Both facts, the court warned, signaled that the parties did not
include the disclaimers in the contract. Id.
Finally, the court abruptly dismissed TSL's public policy argument that invalidating limited-use license agreements would
cripple the software industry. Id. at 104. Judge Wisdom cautioned, however, that courts carefully distinguish between disclaimers conspicuously proffered before contract formation and
disclaimers revealed only after the agreement was consummated.
Id. at 104-05. The court, therefore, concluded that the box-top
license constituted a written confirmation which substantially altered the risk distribution in a contract formed on the basis of the
parties' conduct and that the application of the UCC precluded
incorporation of the warranty disclaimers into the contract. Id. at
105-06.
By invalidating TSL's last minute box-top license, the Third
Circuit commendably sustained UCC principles and effectively
ensured that an iniquitous seller cannot manipulate bilateral contracts. The UCC acknowledges the often informal realities of
business transactions and the Third Circuit, utilizing this analysis, protected the purchasers from the forced acceptance of additional terms introduced at the purchaser's weakest bargaining
position.
While acknowledging the software industry's concerns for
protecting its ownership rights and preventing unlawful transfers, the court commendably refused to allow this motivation to
distinguish software producers from any other party to a sales
contract. The inclusion of last minute terms would defeat the
contract's essential purposes - security, certainty and mutuality
of obligation. The court did not inflict an unduly harsh result,
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but rather recognized that each party to a contract strives to attain the best deal and often attempts to disadvantage unwitting
parties. Software producers may incorporate limited-use license
terms only with the knowledge and consent of the purchaser. As
the Third Circuit carefully acknowledged, terms and disclaimers
will be enforced only when conspicuously offered and agreed to
before contract formation. Any other result would denigrate or
impugn the basic principles of contract law.
Kelly Ann Hardy

PROPERTY-NEW
CENSED

JERSEY REAL ESTATE BROKERS'

BROKER ACTING AS A FINDER

ACT-UNLI-

IN THE SALE

OF AN

ONGOING BUSINESS IS ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION ON THE

PERSONALTY PORTION OF THE BuSINESS-Cooney v. Ritter, 939

F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1991).
In 1982, appellant Donald Ritter (Ritter) expressed to F.
Dring Wetherill (Wetherill), an acquaintance, his desire to sell his
trucking business, Ritter Transportation Inc. 939 F.2d at 82.
Wetherill contacted John Cooney (Cooney) who was experienced
in bringing together buyers and sellers of businesses. During an
initial meeting between Cooney and Ritter, Ritter made a promise to pay Cooney a five percent commission on a completed sale
of Ritter Transportation Inc. In searching for a prospective
buyer, Cooney encouraged a business man, Richard Kirk (Kirk),
to meet with Ritter. Kirk promised to pay Cooney a commission
of $150,000 if the sale was consummated. Id. at 82-83. Cooney
disclosed to Ritter and Kirk that he would receive a commission
from both sides if the deal closed. Id. at 83. Cooney and

Wetherill agreed to split any commissions that might arise from a
Ritter-Kirk transaction.
Although the first business meeting between Cooney, Ritter
and Kirk did not result in a sale, the deal was eventually sealed in
1985 when WISL Transportation Inc., Kirk's company,
purchased all the shares of Ritter Transportation Inc. for
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$5,500,000. Neither Cooney nor Wetherill played a significant
role in the negotiations. Ritter refused to pay the promised commission and Cooney and Wetherill brought a diversity suit in the
United States District Court in the District of New Jersey.
In his defense, Ritter argued that the New Jersey Real Estate
Brokers' Act (the Act) prevented Cooney and Wetherill from collecting a commission on the sale because Ritter Transportation
Inc. had substantial real estate assets and the plaintiffs were not
licensed real estate brokers. Id. at 83 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN
§ 45:15-3 (West 1978)). In opposition, Cooney and Wetherill
submitted that the Act did not apply to the transaction because
the transfer of a business through the sale of its stock was not the
type of sale covered by the Act and because their role in the
transaction was that of a mere "finder" not a broker as statutorily
required. Id. at 83-84.
Agreeing only with Cooney and Wetherill's second argument, the district court held that the Act did not bar their claim.
Id. at 84. The court stated that Cooney and Wetherill were both
entitled to a $137,500 commission from Ritter. Id. Ritter appealed from the judgment and Cooney and Wetherill cross-appealed from the denial of prejudgment interest. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the transaction was subject to the statute, and,
therefore, the plaintiffs were only entitled to a commission on the
personalty portion of the business. Id. at 88.
Judge Pollak, writing for the court, addressed whether the
district court erred in holding that the Act did not bar the suit
because Cooney was a "finder" whose role was only that of
bringing together buyer and seller. Id. at 84. Relying on a recent
New Jersey Supreme Court decision, Judge Pollak noted that the
Act's purpose was to protect consumers from dishonest people
and not to protect businessmen from business brokers. Id. at 8485 (citing Kazmer-Standish Consultants v. Schoeffel Instrument
Corp., 89 N.J. 286, 290, 445 A.2d 1149, 1151 (1982)). The Third
Circuit also recognized that, under the New Jersey Supreme
Court's interpretation, a business broker could collect a commission for his participation in the sale of a business that included a
real estate interest if the listing agreement or surrounding circumstances divided the realty from the rest of the sale. Id. at 85.
Utilizing the New Jersey Supreme Court's definition of a
business broker as "one who, for a fee or compensation, negotiates the transfer or sale of an ongoing business," the Third Cir-
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cuit determined that Cooney's role in the Ritter-Kirk sale was not
that of a business broker. Id. (citation omitted). Judge Pollak explained that, while the the Act has been applied to a business
broker's endeavors, the New Jersey courts have not considered
whether a mere finder is entitled to a commission for the sale of a
business. Id.
The Third Circuit panel, however, disagreed with the district
court's broad conclusion that the New Jersey Supreme Court
would interpret the Act to exempt a finder in the sale of a business. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-3 (West 1978)). Acknowledging that the Act historically had been applied too broadly,
Judge Pollak explained that the New Jersey Supreme Court recently relieved the inequities of past interpretations. Id. (citing
Kazmer-Standish, 89 N.J. 286, 445 A.2d 1149; Kenney v. Paterson
Milk & Cream Co., 110 N.J.L. 141, 164 A. 274 (E. & A. 1933)).
The Third Circuit opined that it was appropriate to allow a
business broker to receive a sales commission on the personalty
portion of an ongoing business, even though the business included real estate assets. Id. at 86. Judge Pollak posited that a
suit should be allowed on a contractual agreement for a personal
property commission when the personalty value is calculated and
listed separately from the real estate value in the sales listing
agreement or surrounding circumstances. Id. The panel emphasized that while business brokers should seperately list personalty
and realty assets in their commission agreements, it would be inequitable to deny a commission to an honest broker who failed to
do so. Id.
Additionally, The Third Circuit stressed that the New Jersey
Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the Act should not be
read to draw a line between full-participation brokers and mere
finders. Id. Judge Pollak explained that such a reading conflicted
with the statutory definition of a real estate broker as one who
"solicits for prospective purchasers or assists or directs in [sic]
procuring of prospects." Id. (quoting Baron & Co., Inc. v. Bank
of N.J., 504 F. Supp. 1189, 1205-06 (D.NJ. 1981)). Consequently, the Third Circuit concluded that, even though he was
merely a finder, Cooney was still subject to the Act. Id.
The Third Circuit further held that the Act applied to the
sale of a business consisting of real estate assets when the transfer was accomplished through the sale of corporate shares rather
than the sale of the corporation's other assets. Id. at 86-87. The
panel explained that the New Jersey Supreme Court did not limit
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the Act's application to sales of residential buildings. Id. at 87.
Moreover, the appellate court explained that the transfer of a
business through the sale of its stock should be treated the same
as a transfer through a sale of its assets. Id.
The panel submitted that the New Jersey Supreme Court
considered the sale of a corporation's stock and the sale of its
assets as equal and valid ways to sell a business and trigger the
Act's application. Id. at 88. As a result, the appellate court stated
the Act applied to Cooney and Wetherill's claim for commissions
resulting from the transfer of Ritter Transportation Inc. through
the sale of its stock. Id. Accordingly, the panel concluded that
Cooney and Wetherill were entitled to their promised five percent commission on the personalty portion of Ritter Transportation Inc. Id. Consequently, Judge Pollak vacated the judgment
below and remanded the case for a new calculation of the commissions owed to Cooney and Wetherill. Id.
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed Cooney and Wetherill's
cross-appeal from the district court's failure to grant prejudgment interest. Id. at 89. The panel determined that Cooney and
Wetherill were entitled to interest on the commissions owed to
them because they were denied use of the money for an extended
period of time. Id. at 90 (citing Fasolo v. Board of Trustees, Div.
of Pensions, 190 N.J. Super. 573, 464 A.2d 1180 (App. Div.
1983)). The panel explained that the district court, on remand,
would be responsible for awarding prejudgment interest on the
commissions owed to Cooney and Wetherill. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Scirica agreed that
there was no distinction between a broker and a mere finder. Id.
(Scirica, J. dissenting). Judge Scirica also conceded that the majority correctly awarded prejudgment interest. Id. Contrary,
however, to the majority's decision, Judge Scirica posited that the
sale of Ritter Transportation was not governed by the Act because the New Jersey legislature intended to protect residential
real estate consumers, not sophisticated business purchasers. Id.
at 91 (Scirica, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The judge explained that the New Jersey Supreme Court's interpretation did
extend the Act to reach the sale of a corporation's stock to a sophisticated business purchaser. Id. The judge also rejected the
majority's conclusion that the form of the sale was irrelevant and,
instead, posited that Cooney and Wetherill were entitled to a
commission on the total purchase price. Id. Judge Scirica explained that Cooney and Wetherwill could recover a commission
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on the personalty portion of the business and, because stock is
considered personal property under New Jersey law, a commission on the total amount. Id.
In Cooney v. Ritter, the Third Cicuit provided a needed stimulus to a stagnant real estate market. Under Cooney, a real estate
broker now has an additional incentive to seek out prospective
business buyers and obtain a healthy commission. Importantly,
the Third Circuit provided that boost without undermining the
legislature's well-reasoned intent. The decision fails, however, in
not allowing Wetherill and Cooney to collect the full amount of
their commissions. As Judge Scirica pointed out, stock is personal property under New Jersey law. Failing to recognize this,
the majority incorrectly limited the commission to the "personal
property" portions of the sale and denied Wetherill and
Cooney's just compensation. Brokers seeking an equitable solution must now look to the New Jersey Supreme Court for a clear
explication that will remedy this injustice.
Lorre A. Colannino

CRIMINAL LAW-FoURTH AMENDMENT-BORDER SEARCH ExCEPTION

To THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT OF

PROBABLE CAUSE, REASONABLE
RANT EXTENDED

To

SEARCHES

SUSPICION OR SEARCH WAROF

OUTBOUND

BAGGAGE-

United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1991).
On April 18, 1990, United States Customs inspectors
targeted an United States flight to Germany for outbound shipments of unreported currency, high technology items, munitions
and other contraband. 936 F.2d at 137. The flight was specifically selected because it had air connections to Nigeria, Pakistan
and Lebanon-areas considered by custom officials as high-risk
for currency exportation and heroin trafficking.
The inspectors chose four passengers from a passenger list,
including Victor Ezeiruaku, for further review. Bound for Brussels, Ezeiruaku initially attracted attention by paying cash for
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overweight bag charges. Customs officials additionally noted
that their presence appeared to make Ezeiruaku's companion
nervous. Id. at 137-38. These factors, coupled with the inspectors belief that Nigerians often transport contraband out of the
United States, prompted the officials to inspect Ezeiruaku's
checked baggage. Id. at 138.
The inspectors found documents relating to the shipment of
cars to Nigeria and $265,000 cash in Ezeiruaku's luggage. The
inspectors located an additional document and $2000 cash after
Ezeiruaku consented to a search of his hand-carried briefcase.
After verifying that the baggage belonged to Ezeiruaku, the inspectors arrested him. Id. at 138-39.
A federal grand jury indicted Ezeiruaku for illegally exporting unreported currency. Id. at 139. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, however, granted
a motion to suppress the cash evidence because no reasonable
suspicion that Ezeirauku was engaged in illegal activity existed at
the time of the search. Id. The district court also concluded that
the search was non-routine and, therefore, unconstitutional
based on its offensive nature. Id. Following suppression of the
evidence, the district court dismissed the indictment. Id.
Reversing the district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the border search exception
to the fourth amendment extended to searches of outgoing baggage. Id. at 137, 143. Writing for the panel, Judge Aldisert began by observing that customs officials searched Ezeiruaku's
checked baggage pursuant to a federal statute which authorized
border searches without reasonable cause or a search warrant.
Id. at 139 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b)).
The appellate panel then asserted that the search of
Ezeiruaku's baggage occurred at the functional equivalent of the
border. Id. at 139-40 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 273 (1973); United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361,
364-65 (3d Cir. 1985)). The Third Circuit explained that the
border search exception authorized customs officials to conduct
routine border searches without individualized suspicion. Id. at
140. The court recognized the long-standing view that border
searches were reasonable for fourth amendment purposes simply
because they occurred at the border. Id. (quoting United States v.
Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1201 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1018, 1068 (1985)).
The circuit judge then examined the distinction between
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routine and non-routine border searches. Id. Judge Aldisert
stated that border searches of incoming property did not require
articulable suspicion. Id. Conversely, the judge explained, nonroutine searches did require reasonable suspicion. Id. The panel
observed that border searches have consistently been deemed
routine and required no degree of suspicion. Id. The court
opined that the district court's characterization of the search of
Ezeiruaku's luggage as non-routine was contrary to substantial
authority. Id. at 141.
The judge further asserted that the district court improperly
limited the border search exception to incoming searches. Id. at
143. The court of appeals identified numerous circuit court decisions which held that the rationale for border searches of incoming property applied equally to outbound searches. Id. at 141
(citations omitted). Adopting the rationale of the Ninth Circuit,
the Third Circuit then reviewed specific factors applicable to
both outgoing and incoming searches: (1) the government's interest in protecting its citizens from drug trafficking, (2) the likelihood of smuggling at the border, (3) the problems in detecting
drug smuggling, (4) the notice to individuals that their privacy
may be invaded upon crossing the border, and (5) the requirement that the searched person be a member of a morally neutral
class. Id. at 142 (citing United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 667
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917, (1978)).
Thereafter, the appellate panel focused on the Eleventh and
Fifth Circuit's approval of outgoing border searches for currency
because of the government's substantial interest in regulating the
exportation of domestic currency outside of the United States.
Id. at 142-43 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Salazar,813 F.2d at
1138; United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1991)).
The Third Circuit joined the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuit Courts by extending the border exception to
searches of outgoing baggage. Id. at 143. The court held that,
because Ezeiruaku's luggage was searched at the functional
equivalent of a United States border, no warrant or reasonable
suspicion was required to justify the search. Id. Accordingly, the
panel reversed the district court's decision of evidence and reinstated the indictment. Id.
The panel turned briefly to a secondary issue presented by
the district court's finding that race or nationality was the basis
for the search of Ezeiruaku's baggage. Id. (quoting United States v.
Ezeiruaku, 754 F. Supp. 420, 422 (E.D.Pa. 1990)). Finding this
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conclusion unsupported by the record, the appellate panel noted
that customs officials selected Ezeiruaku's name from the passenger list because they believed, based on his name, that he was
travelling to Nigeria. Id. The judge emphasized that Ezeiruaku
was not selected because his name appeared to be African. Id.
Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court's
finding that the search was racially motivated was clearly erroneous. Id.
The Third Circuit correctly concluded that, upon entering
or leaving the country, an individual's privacy rights must necessarily yield to the government's desire to protect its citizens. Extension of the border search exception to outgoing baggage is
justified if the search is routine. Nothing about the search of
Ezeiruaku's luggage, however, was routine. The record indicated
that he was singled out by customs officials because he had a
Nigerian-sounding last name. While it may be argued that the
ends justify the means, it is wholly discriminatory to target an
individual for such actions based solely on his or her race or nationality. To justify this egregious act as a necessary protection
from the evils of drugs is a miscarriage of justice. While drug
trafficking unquestionably must be eradicated, the courts should
not dismantle individual rights in pursuit of that goal.
Donna Scocozza

